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Abstract
This paper analyzes the decision making process of adult children to provide informal care
to their parents. First, we develop a structural model to explain the amount of time that
only children (without siblings) spend on providing care, taking into account opportunity costs
in terms of time and money. The model is estimated using two datasets from 12 European
countries and reveals the preferences of adult children for consumption, leisure and informal
care. Although we assume that differences in behavior between children with and without
siblings are due to dissimilar constraints only, by selecting children without siblings we do not
need to make assumptions about the nature of interactions between siblings in the structural
model.
In the presence of siblings, their choices also play a role in the caregiving decision. A central
question is whether siblings make cooperative or non-cooperative decisions. The second part
of this paper aims to establish whether interactions between siblings are cooperative or non-
cooperative, by comparing predicted cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes with observed
outcomes. We use the structural parameter estimates from the first part of the paper and model
the non-cooperative outcomes using a quantal response equilibrium. The results suggest that
the nature of the interactions between siblings has a strong effect on the division of informal
care between siblings. For almost three quarters of the families, the non-cooperative model
has a better fit than the cooperative model. If the non-cooperative families were to be pushed
into their cooperative outcome, their parents would on average receive 50% more informal care
per week from their children, but this would reduce full-time labor supply by 5.7%-points and
increase part-time labor supply by 6.7%.
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1 Introduction
When parents age, their adult children usually face deteriorating parental health and an in-
creased need for care. For the children, the question arises of how to balance the goal of
appropriately caring for parents with other goals in life, such as work and their own family.
Governments, on the other hand, face the challenge of how to reconcile the conflicting goals of
encouraging the provision of care for the elderly by families, and encouraging (female) partici-
pation in the labor market.
A prerequisite for designing effective policies in this area is to understand the complex de-
cision making process at the level of individual families. The outcome of the decision making
process depends on a large number of factors, including the labor market potential of each
adult child in the family, their own family situation, the availability of formal care, the dis-
tances between the parental home and each child’s home and the health status of the parents.
An additional important factor that has received only scant attention in the literature is the
nature of the interactions between siblings, in particular whether these can be characterized as
cooperative or non-cooperative.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze this complex process by developing a structural
model in which adult children allocate their time to work, leisure, and care simultaneously. Our
first contribution to the literature is that we estimate a structural model for children without
siblings (only children), to learn about the preferences of adult children for informal care,
without having to make assumptions about the nature of interactions between siblings. Thus
our maintained assumption is that differences in behavior between children with and without
siblings are due to dissimilar constraints only. In the model, preferences are characterized by a
utility function defined over consumption, leisure, and the amount of care that parents receive
from their children. Children face a time constraint and a budget constraint, which depend on
the (potential) wage in the labor market, and the time and monetary costs of traveling to the
parental home. As far as we know, this is the first study that extracts preferences with regard to
informal care using only children, such that the results are not affected by interactions between
siblings. Only Kotlikoff and Morris (1990) explicitly consider only children, but they analyze
the living arrangements of an only child and a single parent. This study, instead, focuses on
care arrangements, taking living arrangements as given.1
1There are some studies that model both care and living arrangements, e.g. Hoerger et al. (1996) and Pezzin
and Schone (1999).
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Our second contribution to the literature is a first attempt to assess the nature of the in-
teractions between siblings and investigate the potential welfare gains of cooperation between
siblings. In the literature, siblings are often ignored in the decision making process, or included
only as an explanatory variable. However, as noted, among others, by Checkovich and Stern
(2002), caregiving decisions among siblings are not independent and allowing for simultaneous
decision making among siblings improves our understanding of caregiving decisions. Individual
decision making is one of the fundamentals of micro-economic theory. Just as the collective
model explicitly considers individual preferences of household members (Chiappori, 1992; Cher-
chye et al., 2009), the model in this study explicitly considers individual preferences of adult
siblings (from different households). In contrast to the collective model, the model for adult sib-
lings in this paper does not assume in advance that the decision process is cooperative (Pareto
efficient). Some studies that consider caregiving decisions among siblings assume that decisions
are made non-cooperatively (Hiedemann and Stern, 1999; Byrne et al., 2009; Callegaro and
Pasini, 2008; Fontaine et al., 2009), while others assume a two-stage decision process in which
siblings (1) decide whether to participate in caregiving or not, and (2) those who participate
in caregiving make a cooperative care decision (Engers and Stern, 2002). This study computes
cooperative as well as non-cooperative equilibria between siblings using the estimated preference
parameters from the structural model, and compares these equilibria to the observed outcomes
found in the data. To do this, we have to make some assumptions. First, as mentioned before,
siblings are assumed to have the same preferences as only children with regard to leisure, con-
sumption, and the amount of informal care received by the parent. Secondly, we assume that
informal care provided by oneself or by a sibling are perfect substitutes. Finally, we assume that
siblings have their own time and budget constraints and that there are no financial transfers
between siblings.
We bring the model to the data using the first two waves of the Survey of Health, Ageing
and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). SHARE includes information on the distances between
the parental and adult children’s homes, labor market participation, the household situation of
adult children and their parents, and the amount of time spent on caring for parents. Sources
of identification of the econometric model include shocks in the health condition of parents
between the two SHARE waves, and variation in characteristics and outcomes between waves
and between adult children. SHARE does not contain wage and income data of the adult
children. Therefore, we use the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
(EU-SILC) as additional data to impute wage rates and other household income for the adult
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children.
The results show that for 71% of the siblings the non-cooperative model has a better fit than
the cooperative model. If it is possible to push these families into their cooperative equilibrium,
the amount of informal care can be increased, but this would reduce labor supply.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses relevant literature on informal care giving.
In section 3 we specify the structural model and explain the estimation strategy. Section 4
discusses the data, after which section 5 presents the estimation results. Section 6 considers
the nature of the interactions between siblings (cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria) and
investigates the potential welfare gains of cooperation. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review
In the economic, demographic, sociological, and psychological literature on the elderly, consid-
erable attention has been paid to the degree to which children support their (elderly) parents.
Support itself is usually distinguished into instrumental support on the one hand, and social
and emotional support on the other (Hogan and Eggebeen, 1995; Silverstein and Bengtson,
1997). This study focuses on instrumental support, which includes practical help to parents
(e.g., running errands, doing household work), help with personal care (e.g., washing, bathing,
care when sick) and help with paperwork. Research shows that children often provide practical
help to their parents. Even in later life, however, parents in Europe more often help children
than children help parents (Kohli, 1999). Hence, there is little reversal of the flow of practical
support exchange as parents age.
Another category of instrumental support is financial support. Financial support to parents
is rarely given by children in western societies, except among immigrants. Bonsang (2007)
found that only 2.6% of adult children in European countries provide financial assistance to
their parents. In non-western societies, it is more common and often more obligatory that
adult children financially support their parents (Frankenberg et al., 2002; Lee et al., 1994).
Financial support from parents to children is more common. However, these financial transfers
are mainly to children following further education or less well off children, such as those who are
unemployed. As these motivations are not directly related to informal care giving, this study
does not take financial transfers explicitly into account.
In the empirical economic literature we find reduced form models and structural models
investigating (1) the extent to which informal care and formal care are complements or sub-
stitutes, (2) the factors that determine the provision of informal care, and (3) the dependence
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between informal care giving and labor supply.
If informal and formal care are substitutes, informal care can reduce home health care use
and delay nursing home entry. Only then, governmental long term care expenditures can be
reduced and labor shortages in the (long term) health care sector can be reduced, by increasing
informal care. Bolin et al. (2008a) and Bonsang (2009) investigated this issue in European
countries and found that informal care is a substitute for long term care, at least as long as the
needs of the elderly are low and require unskilled types of care. For the U.S. Van Houtven and
Norton (2004) also conclude that informal care and formal care are substitutes. On the other
hand, the introduction of free formal personal care in Scotland in 2002 does not seem to have
reduced informal care (Bell et al., 2006).
The models in the literature focus on a large number of potential determinants. Theoret-
ically, these determinants can be distinguished into demand and supply variables. Demand
variables are characteristics of parents which indicate the degree to which parents ‘need’ sup-
port from their children, such as a parent’s health status, and whether the parent is living with
a partner (Grundy, 2005; Klein Ikkink et al., 1999; Silverstein, 1995; Spitze and Logan, 1989).
Living with a partner is related to less need for support by children, because the partner is the
prime source of giving support to an elderly person (Dykstra, 1993).
Supply variables have to do with the child’s costs and benefits of giving support. Research
shows that there is variation among societies in the degree to which children respond to the
need of their parents, with children in individualistic countries like Sweden and the Netherlands
being less responsive (Kalmijn and Saraceno, 2008). We will therefore include country specific
dummy variables to allow the preferences for informal care to differ across countries.
An important supply variable is time costs. Giving support and paying a visit are time
intensive, especially if support also requires traveling, which is usually the case. There are also
financial costs involved, but there is little evidence that the child’s income situation affects
contact or support (Klein Ikkink et al., 1999; Waite and Harrison, 1992). There are social
status gradients in contact and support, but these have more to do with education and less
with financial aspects of social status (Kalmijn and Dykstra, 2006).
The time budget of an adult child depends on whether the adult child has children. Sev-
eral authors have hypothesized that caring for one’s own children competes with the support
children give to their elderly parents. This phenomenon has been referred to as the ‘sandwich
generation’. There is indeed some evidence that the support daughters give to parents is nega-
tively affected by having children (Klein Ikkink et al., 1999), but there is also evidence for a null
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effect (Eggebeen and Hogan, 1990). A complication is that having ones own children may also
increase contact levels with the parent due to the grandparenting role (Kalmijn and Dykstra,
2006). This may be a reason why there are no consistent effects of having children on support.
Employment also affects children’s time budget, and the opportunity costs of labor may
influence the informal care decision. Several studies have investigated the relation between
employment and informal care using different datasets and methods to correct for the potential
endogeneity bias (caregivers may have different unobserved characteristics than non-caregivers,
which influence both informal care and labor market decisions). The results are mixed. Wolf and
Soldo (1994) find no evidence of reduced propensities to be employed, or of reduced conditional
hours of work, due to the provision of informal care. Others find that informal care reduces
employment significantly among European men and women (Bolin et al., 2008b), and among
U.S. women (Ettner, 1996). Ettner (1995) and Heitmueller and Michaud (2006) find that
caregiving for coresidential parents reduces employment. As in Pezzin and Schone (1997, 1999),
Byrne et al. (2009), and Callegaro and Pasini (2008) we will model the labor force decision and
informal care decision jointly in a structural model. The results are important for understanding
the conflict between women’s increasing economic role in society on the one hand, and the
increasing need for informal support to the elderly on the other (Kohli, 1999).
A final determinant of informal care has to do with family size and family interactions. The
number of siblings in a family may have different effects. First, parents will need less help
from each individual child when they have more children. In addition, children may shirk their
responsibilities if there are many siblings who can do the work, such that the amount of informal
care given by one sibling may depend negatively on the care provided by another. On the other
hand, in the case of a strategic bequest motive (described by Bernheim and Summers, 1985),
the amount of care given by a sibling depends positively on the care given by the other siblings.
However, more recent studies do not support the bequest motive (Sloan et al., 1997; Perozek,
1998; Callegaro and Pasini, 2008). It has been found that siblings are each other’s substitutes.
The more siblings a child has, the less often the child visits the parent and the less often he or
she gives support to the parent (Kalmijn, 2007; Kalmijn and Saraceno, 2008; Spitze and Logan,
1991). In addition to the number of siblings, the nature of the interactions between siblings
plays a role in informal care decisions. In the literature we do not find evidence regarding
whether siblings behave cooperatively or non-cooperatively. This study tries to establish the
behavior of siblings using the preference parameters of only children which are obtained in a
structural model.
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3 Structural Model
This section describes the structural model we use to estimate the amount of time only children
spend on providing informal care to their parents, taking into account the key supply and
demand factors discussed in the previous section. Section 3.1 deals with the specification of
the model and describes the estimation strategy. Section 3.2 explains how we impute wage
rates and other household income in the model, because SHARE contains no information about
the wage rates and other household income of the adult children. We use a wage equation to
impute wage rates and an income equation to impute remaining household income for the adult
children in SHARE.
3.1 Model specification
We specify a structural model to explain the amount of time an adult child spends on paid
work, care for parents, and other activities. In this study all activities other than paid work
and care for parents are called leisure. As in Van Soest (1995), we formulate the model as
a discrete choice problem. In this discrete choice problem adult children can choose between
different combinations of labor, informal care, and leisure, which also lead to different levels of
consumption. With regard to labor we distinguish full-time employment, part-time employment,
and no employment.2 In the model, full-time employment is set to 36 hours of labor per week
and part-time employment to 18 hours of labor per week. Concerning informal care, we consider
the choice to give no substantial amount of informal care, giving between 1 and 4 hours a week
(50% of the informal care givers), between 4 and 8 hours a week (20%) and giving more than 8
hours of informal care a week (30% of the informal care givers). Where no substantial amount
of informal care is given, the hours of informal care in the model is set to zero.3 For the second
informal care category (1-4 hours) we set the number of hours of informal care in the model
to be 2 (the average) and the number of visits to one per week, for the second category (4-8
hours) the number of hours is six (the average) and visits are on a daily basis4. In the last
category (>8 hours per week) we set the number of hours of informal care to be 185 and we
assume that the parents are visited on a daily basis, which is also the median number of visits
2These are the three categories available in the data.
3In the data there are 134 observations giving between 0 and 1 hour of informal care per week. Most of them
give less than 0.25 hours of informal care per week. These people fall into the category ‘no substantial informal
care’.
4The median number of visits in the 4-8 category is also seven per week.
5This is the median number of hours of informal care in the ‘> 8’ category. The average number of hours of
informal care in this category is 29, but this is due to some individuals giving a very high number of hours of
informal care.
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in this category. In total we thus have a choice set of 12 alternatives (3 labor market categories
× 4 informal care categories).
The child derives utility from leisure (tl), consumption (c), and the amount of informal care
his parents receive (ts). We use the following quadratic utility function
U(t) = t′At+ t′b, (1)
where t = (tl, c, ts)
′ , A is a symmetric 3 × 3 matrix with entries αij(i, j = 1, 2, 3) and b =
(bl, bc, bs)
′. For the model to be economically rational, the marginal utility of consumption must
be positive; see e.g. Van Soest and Stancanelli (2010). We will check whether this condition is
satisfied in its estimated version. The marginal utility of informal care may be negative.6 We
maximize the utility function subject to a time and budget constraint. The time and budget
constraints are specified as
tl + th + ts + (τd)K = T
c+Kpdd = wth + µ (2)
where
th = labor time (hours)
K = number of visits (per week)
d = distance to parent (return trip, km)
τ = travel time per kilometer (hours)
T = total time (# hours in one week)
pd = travel costs (per kilometer)
w = wage (per hour)
µ = remaining household income
The time endowment T is 168 hours per week. Remaining household income (µ) includes
all income that is not earned by the adult child under consideration. It includes capital income,
social transfers, and labor income of the partner (if present). We abstract from the fact that
6Estimates of Byrne et al. (2009) show that adult children care about their parents’ health quality, suggesting
that altruism may play an important role in the provision of informal care. However, they also show that
informal care provision tends to be burdensome, which may explain why few family members provide care for
elderly individuals.
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labor market choices of the adult children under consideration and their partners may be de-
termined simultaneously. Furthermore, we assume wage rates7 and the geographical distance
between adult children and their parents to be exogenous.8
To take into account preference variation across adult children, the vectors in b are functions
of observed and unobserved characteristics of the adult children and their parents9
bl = Xlβl + ul
bc = Xcβc + uc
bs = Xsβs + us.
(3)
Xl and Xc contain characteristics which are likely to influence the amount of leisure time and
consumption the adult child prefers, such as the age, gender, education, number of children,
and marital status of the adult child. Xs includes variables influencing the preference for giving
informal care to parents, namely the health position of the parents, whether both parents are
alive and the gender of the parent when the parent is single, the (average) age of the parents,
the gender of the child, country specific dummy variables, and the number of children of the
adult child. Also education is included in the matrix Xs, because higher educated children
may have different value orientations (Kalmijn, 2006). Random preferences due to unobserved
characteristics are incorporated through the terms ul, uc, and us. They capture time invariant
unobserved heterogeneity. For example, us may capture the three motives that are, in addition
to observed characteristics, important in explaining social support: reciprocity, altruism, and
norms of responsibility.10 We assume u = (ul, uc, us) to be distributed jointly normal with mean
zero and covariance Σu 
uluc
us

 ∼ N



00
0

 ,

 σ
2
l σl,c σl,s
σl,c σ
2
c σc,s
σl,s σc,s σ
2
s



 . (4)
7Bolin et al. (2008b) found no statistically significant wage-rate effects of informal care provision in Europe.
8Charles and Sevak (2005) tested whether children’s place of residence endogenously responds to parent’s
health but found no evidence of this.
9While we adopt a specific parametric form for the utility function, preferences are identified nonparametrically.
In general, preferences are not fully identified in a model that disaggregates nonlabor time use since each nonlabor
time use category has the same price, the wage rate (Hicks aggregate commodity theorem). However, in our case
the price of informal care exceeds the price of pure leisure because of travel costs. Moreover, the price ratio varies
across families as wages and distances to parents vary.
10These three motives are investigated in the sociological literature (e.g. Kohli and Ku¨nemund, 2003, and
Kalmijn, 2010). Kalmijn (2010) found that altruism is relatively important for parents to support their children,
however, for adult children, reciprocity and norms of responsibility appear to be relatively more important.
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In addition, we introduce random disturbances to the utilities of the twelve choice opportunities
in the same way as in the multinomial logit model
Uj = U(tl, c, ts) + ǫj j = 1, ..., 12
ǫj ∼ EV (I) j = 1, ..., 12 ǫ1, ..., ǫ12 independent
(5)
leading to the familiar logit choice probabilities
P (Uj > Uk for all k 6= j|X, d,w, µ, u) =
exp(U(tj))/
12∑
k=1
exp(U(tk)).
(6)
Substituting the utility function (1) and the time and budget constraint (2), equation (6)
becomes
P (Uj > Uk for all k 6= j|X, d,w, µ, u) =
exp(t′jAtj + t
′
jb)/
12∑
k=1
exp(t′kAtk + t
′
kb),
(7)
where tj = (tlj , cj , tsj) and tlj and cj are defined by
tlj =T − thj − tsj − (τd)Kj
cj =wthj + µ−Kjpdd. (8)
Equation (7) presents the probability that a certain combination of (tl, c, ts) is chosen, given
observed and unobserved characteristics. The disturbances ǫj can be interpreted as optimization
errors: adult children choose a combination of (tl, c, ts) that is close to optimal, rather than
always fully optimal. This may be due to errors in the perception of the utilities of the set
of alternatives. In contrast, the random effects (ul, uc, us) are known by the adult child (but
unobserved to the researcher). We estimate the model parameters using maximum likelihood.
The likelihood contribution of an individual i who chooses alternative j is
Li(α, β,Σu|X, d,w, µ)
=
∫
+∞
−∞
∫
+∞
−∞
∫
+∞
−∞
P (Uj > Uk for all k 6= j|X, d,w, µ, u)p(u)du,
(9)
where p(u) is the density of vector u. The three dimensional integral can be approximated using
simulations (simulated maximum likelihood). Using R simulations, the likelihood contribution
of equation (9) becomes
LiR(α, β,Σu|X, d,w, µ) =
1
R
R∑
r=1
P (Uj > Uk for all k 6= j|X, d,w, µ, u
r), (10)
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where the draws ur, r = 1 . . . R are from a trivariate normal distribution with mean zero and
variance Σu. Most of the adult children are observed twice (wave 1 and wave 2). The likelihood
contribution of an adult child who is observed in both waves, and chooses alternative j in wave
1 and alternative h in wave 2 is
LiR(α, β,Σu|X, d,w, µ) =
1
R
R∑
r=1
P (Uj1 > Uk1 for all k 6= j|X1, d1, w1, µ1, u
r)
∗ P (Uh2 > Uk2 for all k 6= h|X2, d2, w2, µ2, u
r), (11)
so that the unobserved characteristics are the same in both waves.
A draw ur can be obtained by taking 3 (pseudo-random) draws from a standard normal
distribution (which we shall call θ = (θl, θc, θs)
′) and then calculating (url , u
r
c, u
r
s)
′ = Lθ. Here,
L is the Choleski factor of Σu (the unique lower triangular matrix such that LL
′ = Σu).
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Integrals can be approximated with fewer draws (R) when using Halton draws instead of
pseudo-random draws. This is because Halton sequences provide more coverage of the density
which has to be integrated. For more information about the derivation of Halton sequences see
for example Train (2003), or Drukker and Gates (2006), who discuss the advantages of Halton
sequences when using simulations to approximate integrals numerically.
3.2 Modeling wage rates and remaining household income
Wage rates (w) and remaining household income (µ) of the adult children in SHARE are un-
known. Therefore, we use predictions from a wage equation12 and an equation for remaining
household income. Both equations are estimated using the ‘European Union Statistics on In-
come and Living Conditions’ (EU-SILC).
In EU-SILC we can only observe wages for workers. However, the working population
is probably not a random subsample from the population as people with comparatively high
wages (conditional on, for example, their education level) are more likely to work. There may be
unobservables that influence the decision to participate, as well as the wage rate. A commonly
used method to deal with this sample selection is the method presented by Heckman (1979).
Heckman takes selection bias into account by adding an equation which models the participation
11
u is normally distributed because the sum of normals is normal. Furthermore, the covariance of u is Σu
because Var(u)=E(uu′) = E(Lθ(θL)′) = LE(θθ′)L′ = LVar(θ)L′ = LIL′ = LL′ = Σu (Train, 2003).
12We assume wage rates to be independent of the provision of informal care. This is consistent with the results
of Bolin et al. (2008b), who did not find any statistically significant wage-rate effects of informal care provision.
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decision, and allowing for nonzero correlation between the wage and the participation equation.
We estimate the following Heckman model, for each country separately
ln(w∗i ) = Xwiβw + vwi (12a)
p∗i = Xpiβp + vpi (12b)
wi = w
∗
i if p
∗
i > 0 (12c)
wi = 0 if p
∗
i ≤ 0 (12d)
where (12a) is the wage equation and (12b) is the (probit type) participation equation. Xwi
and Xpi contain personal characteristics such as age, gender, and education level. Generally
an exclusion restriction is required to generate credible estimates from the Heckman selection
model. Therefore, we include dummy variables for having children in the participation equation,
but exclude these from the wage equation. We assume that vp and vw are bivariate normal
distributed [
vp
vw
]
∼ N
([
0
0
]
,
[
1 σwp
σwp σ
2
w
])
(13)
and we estimate the parameters using FIML. As for a probit model, the normalization σ2p = 1 is
used since only the sign of p∗i is observed. For remaining household income (µ) we estimate an
equation using a standard OLS regression, for each country and for men and women separately
ln(µi) = Xµiβµ + vµi, (14)
where Xµi contains personal characteristics such as age, marital status, and education level.
In the structural model, introduced in section 3.1, we take into account that wage rates
and remaining household income are predicted with error. Using the estimated variances of the
errors in the wage equations and the remaining household income equations (σ2w and σ
2
µ) we
integrate the prediction errors out. Van Soest (1995) also uses estimated standard deviations
of the errors in a wage equation to account for prediction errors.
When we take into account prediction errors, the likelihood contribution in equation (9) of
an individual who chooses alternative j becomes
L(α, β,Σu|X, d, βw , σw, βµ, σµ)
=
∫∫∫∫∫
+∞
−∞
P (Uj > Uk for all k 6= j|X, d,w, µ, u)p(u)p(w)p(µ)dudwdµ.
(15)
So that equation (10) becomes
LiR(α, β,Σu|X, d, βw , σw, βµ, σµ) =
1
R
R∑
r=1
P (Uj > Uk for all k 6= j|X, d,w
r , µr, ur),
(16)
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where
wr = exp(X ′wβw + v
r
w) (17)
and vr is a draw from the normal distribution with variance σ2w. In the same way
µr = exp(X ′µβµ + v
r
µ), (18)
where vrµ is a draw from the normal distribution with variance σ
2
µ.
For most countries the estimates of σwp in the EU-SILC data are not significant, which
indicates that selection with regard to unobservables is not very important. We therefore do
not take into account correlations between vw, vµ and the unobserved characteristics (ul, uc, us).
4 Data
This section describes the data we use to estimate the parameters of the model. Section 4.1
describes the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) and section 4.2 the
‘European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions’ (EU-SILC).
4.1 SHARE
SHARE is a multidisciplinary database of microdata on health, socio-economic status and so-
cial and family networks of individuals aged 50 and older in Europe. Data were collected in
2004/2005 (wave 1) and 2006/2007 (wave 2) by face-to-face computer-aided personal interviews
(CAPI), plus a self-completion drop-off part with questions that require more privacy.13 This
study uses 13 countries that have contributed data to SHARE. They represent various regions
in Europe, ranging from Scandinavia (Denmark and Sweden) through Central Europe (Aus-
tria, France, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands) to the Mediterranean (Spain, Italy and
Greece). In the second wave two ‘new’ EU member states have contributed data to SHARE
(Czech Republic and Poland). Other countries available in SHARE that we do not use in this
13The SHARE data collection has been primarily funded by the European Commission through the 5th
framework programme (project QLK6-CT-2001- 00360 in the thematic programme Quality of Life), through
the 6th framework programme (projects SHARE-I3, RII-CT- 2006-062193, COMPARE, CIT5-CT-2005-028857)
and through the 7th framework programme (SHARE-PREP, 211909 and SHARE-LEAP, 227822). Additional
funding from the U.S. National Institute on Aging (U01 AG09740-13S2, P01 AG005842, P01 AG08291, P30
AG12815, Y1-AG-4553-01 and OGHA 04-064, IAG BSR06-11, R21 AG025169) as well as from various national
sources is gratefully acknowledged (www.share-project.org).
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study are Israel and Ireland. We do not use these countries because they are not represented
in the EU-SILC data, which we describe in the next section.
Several papers use SHARE to study informal care giving. Most of these studies use the
respondents as providers of informal care (e.g. Bonsang, 2007, 2009, and Bolin et al., 2008a,b).
This study considers the respondents in their role as (potential) receivers of informal care.
Crespo and Mira (2010) call this the ‘parents-sample’ as the respondents are the elderly parents.
The reason for using the ‘parents-sample’ is that we need information on all siblings within a
family. The respondents (in our case ‘the parents’) give information about all their children
that are still alive (sex, year of birth, geographical distance between the children and their
parents, education, marital status, number of children, the employment status of the children,
and the amount of informal care they receive from their children). If we were to consider the
respondents as the providers of informal care, there would be no information on the amount of
care the siblings of the respondents give to their parents. The health situation of the parents
provides a measure for the amount of care parents need. SHARE provides a lot of health
related variables, such as self-reported health, limitations in activities of daily living (ADL and
IADL), mental health, diagnosed chronic conditions, whether people are suffering from several
symptoms and limitations in functioning (e.g. measures by grip strength and walking speed).
In this study we use self-reported health which has the lowest number of missing data. The
parents are asked to rate their health on a five-point scale, ranging from very good to very poor
(wave 1) or from excellent to poor (wave 2).
We select all respondents with one or two adult children. Furthermore, our interest is in
children who are 40 years or older, as these children are most likely to be involved in personal
care for their elderly parents. Following McGarry (1999), Bonsang (2007), and Norton and
Van Houtven (2006) we omit households where children are living in the same household as the
respondent, because there is no detailed information on informal care giving within households.
For the same reason we exclude respondents where grand-children, siblings, and non-relatives
are living in the same household as the respondent. Families with one or two self-employed
adult children are excluded, because we have no information about the number of hours that
self-employed people work. Also, families where one or both children have the daily activity
given as ‘sick’ are excluded, as they may not be able to give informal care. After excluding
respondents for whom key information is missing, we end up with 2253 respondents with one
adult child and 2891 respondents with two adult children.
Table 1 shows the amount of informal care and the number of adult children per country.
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Informal care includes practical household help (e.g. household chores, shopping and home
repairs), personal care (e.g. dressing, bathing, eating) and help with paperwork. Adults report
whether their children help them on an almost daily basis, weekly, monthly or less often. Fur-
thermore, they were asked to give an estimate of the number of hours of informal care received
on a typical day, week, month or year. We transform these answers to a variable measuring the
average amount of informal care that adults receive from their children per week. We define
people as involved in informal care when they give one hour or more of informal care per week.
Table 1: Informal care per countrya
Country only child % informal # hrs 1 sibling % informal # hrs
care care
Austria 218 14.7 15.9 438 12.3 6.9
Germany 294 19.0 17.3 572 15.0 6.3
Sweden 217 10.6 7.1 674 7.6 5.9
Netherlands 115 7.8 3.0 442 4.3 4.8
Spain 99 13.1 17.2 308 9.7 19.5
Italy 167 12.0 18.4 338 8.6 12.8
France 263 14.1 10.0 508 9.6 6.2
Denmark 134 11.2 4.5 512 6.3 6.8
Greece 213 19.7 17.1 804 19.5 12.5
Belgium 318 20.1 5.8 528 8.1 10.8
Czech Republic 165 24.2 11.8 450 29.6 10.7
Poland 50 16.0 16.5 208 16.8 5.1
Total 2253 15.9 12.2 5782 12.4 9.5
a Percentage of children involved in informal care and the number of hours of informal care,
conditional on giving any informal care, per country.
In Germany, Greece, the Czech Republic and Poland, many people are involved in informal
care giving (more than 15% of the only children and siblings). Conditional on being involved in
informal care, children in Mediterranean countries give relatively many hours of informal care,
whereas the children in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden give a relatively small amount
of informal care. When we compare only children and siblings, we find that in general only
children are more often involved in informal care giving than siblings and that they also provide
more hours of informal care. This suggests that the hours of care provided by a sibling are a
substitute for someone’s own informal care.
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Table 2 presents information about informal care giving and the geographical distances
between children and their parents. The higher the distance between children and their parents,
the higher the traveling time and costs, and the lower the fraction of people involved in informal
care. It appears that the distribution of only children and siblings among the categories is about
the same (so that only children do not in general live closer or further away from their parents
than siblings).
As expected, the provision of informal care is higher for children with parents in bad health
than for children with parents in good health (table 3). In the analysis we distinguish single
parents and parents living with a partner, as parents may provide informal care to each other
when they are both alive. It appears that when the mother of a child is in poor health and the
father is in good health there is more informal care from adult children than when the father is
in poor health and the mother is in good health. The reason may be that men in the observed
generations have less household management skills than women.
Table 2: Distance and informal carea
Distance only child % inf. # hrs 1 sibling % inf. # hours
care care
same building 9.8 29.0 15.7 7.1 31.0 12.4
≤ 1 kilometer 17.2 20.7 11.0 15.3 19.1 12.3
1-5 kilometers 18.8 19.9 8.1 21.0 15.9 8.3
5-25 kilometers 25.6 15.9 13.1 23.2 10.5 6.3
25-100 kilometers 12.6 9.9 13.3 15.3 6.8 5.7
100-500 kilometers 10.0 4.4 24.3 11.1 3.6 6.5
≥ 500 kilometers 3.0 0.0 - 3.3 1.1 86.0
≥ 500 kilometers 3.0 1.5 1.9 3.7 1.4 1.4
and another country
Total 100 15.9 12.2 100 12.4 9.5
a Percentage of children involved in informal care and the number of hours of informal
care, conditional on giving any informal care, per distance category.
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Table 3: Health and informal carea
Health only child % inf. # hrs 1 sibling % inf. # hours
care care
Father, good / very good 8.7 6.1 4.5 7.7 6.3 13.5
Father, fair 4.9 19.8 9.6 5.9 12.4 5.0
Father, poor 2.4 34.0 15.9 2.3 23.5 8.4
Mother, good / very good 21.3 16.4 7.6 22.8 12.2 7.1
Mother, fair 17.8 24.2 9.8 15.0 19.5 10.1
Mother, poor 8.5 33.3 22 7.1 26.5 12.1
Both poor, or poor and fair 5.0 20.5 23.3 5.3 21.8 14.6
Both fair, or fair and good 15.6 6.5 7.2 17.5 5.9 7.9
Both good / very good 12.4 2.5 7.1 13.0 3.1 3.8
Father poor, mother good 1.7 12.8 2.9 1.7 10.4 5.6
Father good, mother poor 1.6 25.0 11.8 1.8 18.3 11.1
Total 100 15.9 12.2 100 12.4 9.5
a Percentage of children involved in informal care and the number of hours of informal care,
conditional on giving any informal care, per health status of the elderly parent. In the first
three categories the adult child only has a father, in the fourth to the sixth category the adult
child only has a mother, and in the last five categories the adult child has a father and a mother.
Table 4: Daily activity and informal carea
Daily activity only child % informal # hrs 1 sibling % informal # hrs
care care
full-time work 67.2 13.4 8.3 73.6 11.0 7.8
part-time work 8.2 15.2 7.6 8.8 11.2 5.9
unemployed 5.5 17.1 11.0 3.0 16.8 13.2
in education 0.6 7.1 14.0 0.3 0.0 -
parental leave 0.3 0.0 - 0.1 0.0 -
(early) retirement 8.1 31.1 20.4 5.4 26.4 10.9
homemaker 9.2 21.7 21.8 8.1 17.3 18.8
other 0.9 20.0 25.1 0.8 0.0 -
Total 100 15.9 12.2 100 12.4 9.5
a Percentage of children involved in informal care and the number of hours of informal care,
conditional on giving any informal care, per daily activity of the adult child.
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Table 4 shows the amount of informal care by the daily activity of the child. It is interesting
to see that the amount of informal care does not differ much between children in full-time
employment and those in part-time employment. Children who are (early) retired or are looking
after home are most often involved in informal care. However, note that retired persons have
relatively older parents, who are more often in bad health. Finally, women are more often
involved in informal care than men and often provide more hours of informal care (table 5).
Table 5: Gendera
Gender only child % informal # hrs 1 sibling % informal # hours
care care
Female 53.8 17.7 14.1 51.9 14.8 9.9
Male 46.2 13.8 9.4 48.1 9.8 8.8
Total 100 15.9 12.2 100 12.4 9.5
a Percentage of children involved in informal care and the number of hours of informal
care, conditional on giving any informal care, per gender of the adult child.
4.2 EU-SILC
The wage equation and the equation for remaining household income, described in section 3.2,
are estimated using EU-SILC data. EU-SILC contains microdata on income, poverty, social
exclusion and living conditions in Europe. It comprises information from surveys and registers
from the EU member states, that are collated by Eurostat. We select people up to age 76
and omit households who receive income from self-employment or who are permanently sick or
disabled (just as in SHARE). Furthermore, we exclude observations which have missing data
for one or more of the variables in the model. We end up with 55,100 observations, which are
described in table 6.
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Table 6: Descriptives EU-SILC
AT BE CZ DE DK ES FR
Male (%) 49 48 47 46 49 47 48
Age (mean) 45 43 46 47 45 43 43
Primary education (%) 1 14 0 2 0 33 12
Lower secondary education (%) 24 18 19 16 29 22 13
(Upper) secondary education (%) 53 34 69 46 43 21 47
Post secondary non-tertiary education (%) 9 2 1 6 0 1 2
Tertiary education (%) 13 31 12 30 28 23 26
Man with partner (%) 35 32 32 32 38 31 34
Woman with partner (%) 34 35 32 31 37 33 32
Man with child (%) 22 24 17 21 23 24 25
Woman with child (%) 23 26 19 25 25 24 26
Net wage rate (mean) 10 11 2 10 14 8 11
Nonlabor income (mean) 27413 24240 5990 24718 28575 18717 24010
N 1488 1346 1095 6028 1422 7171 3221
GR IT NL PL SE Total
Male (%) 44 47 51 46 50 47
Age (mean) 43 46 45 42 43 44
Primary education (%) 28 27 9 17 9 18
Lower secondary education (%) 13 29 24 7 16 20
(Upper) secondary education (%) 36 32 37 60 42 41
Post secondary non-tertiary education (%) 5 5 3 3 5 4
Tertiary education (%) 19 7 27 13 28 18
Man with partner (%) 28 30 40 30 38 32
Woman with partner (%) 32 32 35 33 37 33
Man with child (%) 22 21 25 27 27 23
Woman with child (%) 25 22 21 31 26 25
Net wage rate (mean) 7 9 12 2 10 9
Nonlabor income (mean) 15475 22161 22036 4835 23742 18709
N 1345 14155 6007 10464 1358 55100
5 Estimation results
This section presents the estimation results of the wage equation, the equation for remaining
household income, and the parameters of the structural model explained in section 3. We start
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with the estimation results of the wage equation and the equation for remaining household
income, since these are needed as input to estimate the parameters of the structural model.
5.1 Wage equation and remaining household income
Wage equations are estimated for each country separately. Table 7 describes the wage equation
for Sweden. The wage equations for all other countries are estimated in a similar way and are
available on request.
Table 7 shows that wage rates increase with age and are significantly higher for people
with a high education level. σwp is not significantly different from zero, indicating that sample
selection is not a significant issue. This also holds for most of the other countries.14
Table 8 shows the estimation results of remaining household income for Sweden. Again, the
equations for the other countries are estimated in a similar way and are available on request.
Remaining household income increases with age. Furthermore, in Sweden remaining household
income is not significantly different for different education categories. Next, we will use the
wage equations and the equations for remaining household income from EU-SILC to estimate
the parameters of the structural model.
5.2 Estimation results of the structural model
Table 9 presents the estimation results of the structural model.15 This section first describes
the parameter estimates related to the preferences for informal care (ts), then the parameter
estimates related to leisure (tl), and finally the parameter estimates related to consumption
(c). With regard to informal care the results show significant decreasing returns to scale (αss is
significantly negative). Furthermore, the interaction term αls is significantly positive, meaning
that when the amount of informal care is already high, the utility of an extra hour of leisure
increases. When parents are in bad health they need more attention and the estimates show
that this increases the preference for informal care. The preference for informal care is highest
when a single living father or mother has poor health, when both parents are in poor health, or
when the mother has poor health and the father is in good health. On the other hand, when the
14Due to measurement errors in the wage rates, the standard deviation of the errors in the wage equation may
be overestimated. A sensitivity analysis, in which we for example multiply σw by 0.8 for all countries, indicates
that this does not influence the structural estimation results very much.
15Our estimation procedure uses 25 drawings. The estimation is computer intensive. Other studies with these
kind of models have used for example 5 or 10 drawings which produce qualitatively similar results (Van Soest,
1995) or 10 drawings (Van Soest and Stancanelli, 2010).
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Table 7: Estimation results wage equation Sweden, sample
selection modela
Equation 1: ln(wage rate) Coefficient St. error
Man 0.157 0.105
Age 0.019 0.017
Age2/100 -0.010 0.020
Primary education -0.070 0.109
Lower secondary education -0.057 0.083
(Upper) secondary education 0.000 -
Post secondary non-tertiary education 0.051 0.089
Tertiary education 0.109 0.046
Man with partner 0.073 0.088
Woman with partner -0.092 0.082
Intercept 1.458 0.368
Equation 2: participation decision
Man -0.069 0.196
Age 15-29 0.000 -
Age 30-39 1.045 0.157
Age 40-49 1.010 0.143
Age 50-59 1.147 0.166
Age ≥ 60 -1.193 0.155
Primary education -0.351 0.163
Lower secondary education -0.962 0.130
(Upper) secondary education 0.000 -
Post secondary non-tertiary education -0.355 0.194
Tertiary education 0.090 0.117
Man with partner 0.612 0.152
Woman with partner 0.574 0.145
Man with child -0.022 0.144
Woman with child -0.514 0.151
Intercept 0.206 0.169
ρ 0.016 0.157
σw 0.615 0.014
σwp = ρσw 0.010 0.097
N 1358
Censored observations 422
Uncensored observations 936
Log likelihood -1374.725
a The reference individual is a woman with (upper) secondary educa-
tion in the age category 15-29. She has no partner and no children.
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Table 8: Estimation results remaining household income, Swedena
ln(remaining household income) Men Women
Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error
Age -0.097 0.023 -0.040 0.023
Age2 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
Primary education -0.115 0.227 0.051 0.232
Lower secondary education 0.326 0.186 0.185 0.189
(Upper) secondary education 0.000 - 0.000 -
Post secondary non-tertiary education 0.109 0.248 -0.156 0.300
Tertiary education 0.203 0.149 0.028 0.136
Married 0.440 0.163 0.421 0.167
Widowed 0.054 0.453 -0.442 0.341
Divorced -0.658 0.292 -0.676 0.231
Never married 0.000 - 0.000 -
Having a child 0.724 0.138 0.845 0.141
Intercept 10.524 0.454 9.766 0.468
N 655 638
R-squared 0.115 0.116
Adj R-squared 0.101 0.102
σµ 1.466 1.434
a The reference individual is a man (left) or woman (right) who has never been married, with
(upper) secondary education and no children.
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father is in poor health and the mother is in good health, the preference for informal care giving
is lower. Presumably, mothers are better able to give informal care to their spouses than fathers
are able to give informal care to the mothers of the adult children. Several studies find that
mothers receive more care than fathers (Bonsang 2007; Klein Ikkink et al. 1999; Attias-Donfut
et al. 2005). Our results suggest that this depends on the health of the parent. Mothers in good
health receive more informal care than fathers in good health, but fathers in fair or poor health
receive more informal care than mothers in fair or poor health (which is also as expected, if
fathers in the observed generation indeed have lower household management skills). In addition
to poor health, the preference for informal care increases with the age of the parent(s). This is
in accordance with the literature, indicating that even after extensively controlling for disability,
age remains an important driver of long term care use (De Meijer et al., 2009). The country
specific dummy variables comprise institutional as well as cultural differences between countries.
Institutional differences constitute for example publicly financed long term care programmes,16
and the availability of formal care. Cultural differences include differences in social norms with
regard to informal care and the degree to which family ties are considered to be important.
It has been found that southern European countries have stronger family ties than northern
European countries (Reher, 1998). The estimation results show that preferences with regard
to informal care are relatively high in Greece, Germany, Belgium, Austria, and the Czech
Republic.17 Higher educated children have significantly lower preferences for informal care than
lower educated children. One argument in the literature is that higher educated children provide
less care than lower educated children because higher educated children live farther away from
their parents due to geographical labor market restrictions. However, also after taking into
account distance we find a significant effect of education on the preference for informal care,
which may be explained by different value orientations of the higher educated (Kalmijn, 2006)18
and/or competing interests (Waite and Harrison, 1992). Finally, we find that women have
significantly higher preferences for providing informal care than men.
16An overview of publicly financed long term care programmes can be found in Bolin et al. (2008b).
17It is notable that southern European countries like Italy and Spain do not have significantly positive results
here. Probably this has to do with living arrangements. In Italy and Spain many adult care givers co-reside with
their parents and these households are not included in this analysis.
18Kalmijn (2006) found that face-to-face contact between higher educated children and their parents is relatively
low, even after controlling for distance.
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Table 9: Estimation results structural modela
Coef. Std. err. p-value
αll (t
2
l ) -0.00018 0.00019 0.358
αcc (c
2) 1.44e-07 2.38e-07 0.546
αss (t
2
s) -0.01226 0.00445 0.006
αlc (tl × c) 0.00002 0.00001 0.003
αls (ts × tl) 0.00230 0.00102 0.023
αcs (ts × c) -1.43e-06 0.00002 0.945
βl0 (tl) -0.25464 0.05971 0.000
βl1 (tl× child is man) -0.10354 0.02051 0.000
βl2 (tl× number children) 0.02203 0.00907 0.015
βl3 (tl× man×number children) -0.03900 0.01133 0.001
βl4 (tl× age child) 0.00564 0.00084 0.000
βl5 (tl× child is married) 0.00757 0.01535 0.622
βl6 (tl× child is divorced) -0.01272 0.02226 0.568
βl7 (tl× child is widowed) 0.04751 0.04445 0.285
βl8 (tl× child has low education level) 0.13144 0.03673 0.000
βl9 (tl× child has high education level) -0.03662 0.01288 0.004
βc0 (c) 0.02788 0.00410 0.000
βc1 (tc× child is man) 0.00292 0.00161 0.070
βc2 (tc× number children) -0.00096 0.00087 0.271
βc3 (tc× man×number children) 0.00106 0.00092 0.249
βc4 (tc× age child) -0.00050 0.00007 0.000
βc5 (tc× child is married) 0.00348 0.00133 0.009
βc6 (tc× child is divorced) 0.00355 0.00203 0.080
βc7 (tc× child is widowed) 0.00235 0.00572 0.682
βc8 (tc× child has low education level) 0.00288 0.00483 0.552
βc9 (tc× child has high education level) 0.00320 0.00097 0.001
βs0 (ts) -3.03510 0.31385 0.000
βs1 (ts× child is man) -0.23573 0.11326 0.037
βs2 (ts× number children) 0.03988 0.04162 0.338
βs3 (ts× man×number children) -0.11870 0.05818 0.041
βs4 (ts× father good / very good health) -0.10545 0.18083 0.560
βs5 (ts× father fair health) 0.88709 0.17274 0.000
βs6 (ts× father poor health) 1.11773 0.20649 0.000
a Table continues on the next page.
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Table 9: Estimation results structural model, continueda
Coef. Std. err. p-value
βs7 (ts× mother good / very good health) 0.57372 0.15491 0.000
βs8 (ts× mother fair health) 0.72741 0.14136 0.000
βs9 (ts× mother poor health) 1.06507 0.16237 0.000
βs10 (ts× both poor, or poor and fair health) 1.01035 0.16383 0.000
βs11 (ts× both fair, or fair and good health) 0.43515 0.13891 0.002
βs12 (ts× father poor, mother good health) 0.67826 0.24108 0.005
βs13 (ts× father good, mother poor health) 1.36701 0.22906 0.000
βs14 (ts× Germany) 0.34698 0.12951 0.007
βs15 (ts× Italy) -0.05540 0.14384 0.700
βs16 (ts× Greece) 0.41713 0.12893 0.001
βs17 (ts× Spain) 0.21706 0.14050 0.122
βs18 (ts× France) 0.22165 0.12188 0.069
βs19 (ts× Netherlands) -0.38264 0.18871 0.043
βs20 (ts× Denmark) 0.18658 0.15070 0.216
βs21 (ts× Belgium) 0.34925 0.12576 0.005
βs22 (ts× Austria) 0.27338 0.13071 0.036
βs23 (ts× Poland) -0.30224 0.18413 0.101
βs24 (ts× Czech Republic) 0.59367 0.15322 0.000
βs25 (ts× (average) age parent - 55) 0.03911 0.00492 0.000
βs26 (ts× child has low education level) 0.36887 0.11600 0.001
βs27 (ts× child has high education level) -0.25675 0.07192 0.000
σ2l 0.02078 0.00442 0.000
σ2c 0.00007 0.00001 0.000
σ2s 1.02037 0.21353 0.000
σlc -0.00121 0.00022 0.000
σls 0.02571 0.00853 0.003
σcs -0.00148 0.00042 0.000
Log likelihood -2814.912
N 2253.000
a The reference individual is a female adult child who has never been married, of whom both parents
are alive, have a good / very good health position, and are living in Sweden.
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Secondly, we describe the parameter estimates related to leisure (tl). The preference for
leisure increases with age and is somewhat lower for men than for women. Children increase
women’s preferences for leisure significantly, probably because more children often mean more
responsibilities for adult daughters inside their own households (the care for a child also belongs
to ‘leisure time’ in this model). Marital status does not affect adult children’s preferences for
leisure. Married persons spend leisure time with each other, but on the other hand household
production is more efficient for couples than for singles, which saves time.19 Finally, compared
to medium educated children, lower educated children have significantly higher preferences for
leisure, and higher educated children have significantly lower preferences for leisure. It is possible
that less favorable labor conditions among the lower educated bring about higher preferences
for leisure time rather than labor time.
The parameter estimates related to consumption (c) show that older children have signif-
icantly lower preferences for consumption. In addition, married persons and higher educated
individuals have a relatively high preference for consumption. As mentioned before, for the
model to be economically rational, the marginal utility of consumption must be positive. We
find that for all but 18 observations (0.8%) this condition holds. These 18 adult children have
a high age, which leads to a relatively low preference for consumption in the model (as can be
seen from the coefficient βc4).
The final part of table 9 shows the estimates of the covariance matrix of the unobserved
heterogeneity terms (equation 4), which are in line with our expectations. All coefficients are
significant, indicating that unobserved heterogeneity is important. The negative sign of σlc
indicates that unobserved characteristics that increase the preference for leisure tend to have a
negative effect on the preference for consumption. In the same way, the negative value for σcs
indicates that unobserved characteristics which increase the preference for informal care, have in
general a negative effect on the preference for consumption. Finally, σls shows that if individuals
have a relatively high preference for leisure (conditional on the observed characteristics in the
model), they also have on average a somewhat higher preference for informal care.
The relations between wage rates, distances, and informal care follow from the estimated
preference parameters and the time and budget constraints. To facilitate interpretation of the
results, figure 1 shows the relation between geographical distance and the amount of informal
care given by a reference individual in the model. As a reference individual we consider a married
19Waite and Harrison (1992) found that the presence of a husband decreases the number of visits a woman has
with friends, but does not reduce a woman’s social contacts with kin.
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German woman of 55, with an 80 year old father in poor health, no mother, and 2 children of
her own. She has a medium education level, a wage rate of 10 euros per hour and her remaining
household income is 15,000 euros per year. Unobserved heterogeneity is important regarding
the preferences for informal care. Figure 1 therefore shows seven lines. Each line represents the
reference individual with a different random effect us. These reflect, for example, different levels
of family ties, degree of altruism, or feelings of obligation to provide informal care. The line
‘p50’ shows the relationship between distance and informal care when all random effects ul, uc
and us are equal to zero. This means that the unobserved preferences with regard to leisure,
consumption, and informal care are at the median level. For example, with regard to informal
care we can interpret this reference individual to have ‘median responsibility norms’. The line
‘p90’ represents the reference individual with high unobserved preferences for informal care.
Only 10% of the individuals have a higher random effect us. The same explanation holds for
the other lines, p10, p25, p60, p70, and p80. For example, for line p25, only 25% of the people
have smaller unobserved preferences for informal care. ul and uc are zero for all lines, such that
the only difference between the lines is the random effect us, the unobserved heterogeneity with
regard to informal care.
Figure 1: Estimated relationship between distance and the expected supply of informal care
0
5
10
15
20
In
fo
rm
al
 c
ar
e 
(ho
urs
)
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
distance
p10 p25 p50 p60
p70 p80 p90
Figure 1 shows that the reference person with ‘median’ unobserved preferences for informal
care provides almost no informal care (p50). This is as expected, since we found in table 3
that only 34% of only children with a father in poor health provide informal care. The higher
the preference of the reference individual to provide care, the longer it takes before informal
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care decreases with distance (the distance elasticity is lower for those with high preferences for
informal care).
The distance between adult children and their parents may also influence the labor force
participation of the adult children. Unsurprisingly, figure 2 shows that for the majority of adult
children, who provide almost no informal care, distance does not influence labor force partici-
pation (p10, p25 and p50). Focussing on p70, we see that labor supply increases with distance.
Apparently, at least part of the reduction in informal care is replaced by labor. For those with
relatively high preferences for informal care, labor force participation first declines when dis-
tance increases, as more travel time is needed for the provision of informal care. However, after
a certain distance (e.g. 50 kilometers for the 80th percentile), informal care decreases and labor
force participation increases.
Figure 2: Estimated relationship between distance and the expected labor supply
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Figure 3 and 4 show the relation between the wage rate of the reference individual, the
expected number of hours of participation in the labor market, and the hours of informal
care the reference individual provides to her father. In these figures the distance between the
reference individual and her father is 7.5 kilometers. The seven lines represent different levels of
the unobserved heterogeneity term with regard to informal care, just as explained for figure 1.
In line with the literature (e.g. Evers et al., 2008), figure 3 shows a positive wage elasticity of
labor supply. Reference individuals with higher preferences for informal care are less active in
the labor market. For example, at the wage rate of 10 euros per hour, the reference individual
with a high preference for informal care (p90) participates about 9 hours less in the labor market
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than the reference individual with a low unobserved preference for informal care (p10).
Figure 3: Estimated relationship between wages and the expected labor supply
0
10
20
30
40
La
bo
r (
ho
urs
)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
wage
p10 p25 p50 p60
p70 p80 p90
Figure 4: Estimated relationship between wages and the expected supply of informal care
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According to figure 4 the wage elasticity of informal care supply is small. The wage elasticity
for a reference individual with large norms of responsibility (or other reasons that lead to a high
unobserved preference for informal care) is almost zero.
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6 Two adult children
In families with two siblings, informal care provision to parents is determined by the character-
istics of both siblings, and the nature of the interaction between siblings. In this section we use
the estimates of the structural model, estimated for only children, to families with two adult
children. When applying the estimates of only children to siblings, some assumptions are re-
quired. First of all, we assume that siblings have the same preferences for leisure, consumption
and informal care as only children. Regarding informal care, this assumption is in line with
Spitze and Logan (1991), who found that children’s closeness to parents and attitudes towards
filial responsibility are unrelated to being an only child or not. According to their study, dif-
ferences in support between families with different numbers of siblings are not attributable to
different attitudes or feelings of closeness between these families. Instead, to explain differences
in support between families of different size, they propose that attention should be paid to
how each child adjusts his or her own behavior when more children are potentially available for
support to parents (which corresponds to our assumption). The only difference between only
children and siblings in our model is that in families with two adult children there is now a
sibling available who can also provide informal care (the hours of informal care ts in the utility
function becomes the sum of own informal care and informal care provided by the sibling). We
assume that informal care provided by oneself and by the sibling are perfect substitutes. This
means that children receive the same direct utility from an hour of informal care provided by
themselves or by their sibling (this utility is βs, from equation 3). Also, an hour of informal
care provided by one of the siblings decreases the marginal utility of an extra hour of informal
care by αss (as in the model for only children), it increases the utility obtained from leisure by
αls, and it changes the marginal utility of consumption by αcs (not significant). Only, for those
siblings with a negative direct utility from informal care (βs < 0), we assume that they do not
receive any direct utility from an extra hour of informal care provided by their sibling (these are,
for example, individuals with healthy parents and/or low unobserved preferences for informal
care). Finally, we assume that both siblings have their own time and budget constraints and
that there are no financial transfers between siblings. The amount of informal care provided
may be the outcome of a non-cooperative or cooperative game between two siblings.
Section 6.1 describes how we derive non-cooperative and cooperative equilibria. Next, we
show some simulations of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior between reference siblings
(6.2). Finally, we apply the model estimated in this study to the families with two siblings in
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SHARE, to gain an indication of whether siblings behave cooperatively or non-cooperatively,
and to estimate the expected gains from cooperation between siblings (6.3).
6.1 Cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria
6.1.1 Non-cooperative equilibrium
In the non-cooperative equilibrium, we assume that both siblings maximize their utility, given
the choice of their sibling and their own time and budget constraints. We use a generalization of
the Nash equilibrium, based on the assumption that a player’s rationality is bounded. Bounded
rationality is incorporated by adding random disturbance to the payoffs of the players, just as we
did for only children in (5). Just as for only children, we assume that siblings are more likely to
choose better strategies than worse strategies, but do not play the best strategy with probability
one (children are “better responders” rather than “best responders”). This concept, in a game-
theoretic framework, has been explained by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998) and is called
the Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE). As we add random errors distributed according
to the type I extreme value distribution, we have a special version of the Quantal Response
Equilibrium, namely the logit equilibrium (LQRE, Anderson et al., 2002). The LQRE extends
the model we estimated for only children to the situation with two or more siblings. In the logit
equilibrium the sibling’s alternatives are chosen according to the probability distribution
pi,m =
exp(λE(U(ti,m|pj))∑
12
k=1 exp(λE(U(ti,k|pj))
m = 1, . . . , 12 (19)
where pi,m is the probability of sibling i choosing alternative m. E(U(ti,m|pj)) is the expected
utility to player i of choosing alternative m when sibling j has probability distribution pj for
the 12 alternatives. The time and budget constraints are substituted in the utility function.
The nonnegative parameter λ is inversely related to the level of error and can be interpreted to
reflect the degree of bounded rationality. When λ→∞, players become ‘perfectly rational’ and
the logit equilibrium converges to the Nash equilibrium. In the other extreme case, when λ = 0,
the probabilities of the twelve alternatives converge to 1/12, for both siblings (i.e., siblings make
extremely noisy choices). Unfortunately, the error parameter λ cannot be identified (Haile et al.,
2008). Standard multinomial logit models assume λ = 1 and consistent with the model for only
children, we also assume λ = 1.20
The logit response functions pi and pj are functions of each other. For example, the prob-
ability of sibling 1 choosing alternative m depends on the probabilities of sibling 2 choosing
20For future research it may be interesting to allow λ to vary with the education levels of the adult children.
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alternatives 1 to 12. On the other hand, the probability of sibling 2 choosing alternative m
depends on the probabilities of sibling 1 choosing alternatives 1 to 12. We find the logit equi-
librium by solving the logit response functions, which form a system of 24 nonlinear equations
that are listed in Appendix A.
6.1.2 Cooperative equilibrium
In the cooperative equilibrium, we assume that siblings maximize the sum of their utilities.
U(t1, t2) = γ U(t1) + (1− γ) U(t2) γ ∈ [0, 1] (20)
subject to their own time and budget constraints. We choose γ = 0.5, which is one choice out
of the large set of Pareto solutions.21
For each of the 12×12 = 144 possible alternatives for the two siblings we compute U(t1, t2),
and we use these utilities to compute the probability of each alternative in the same way as we
did for only children (equation 6). The probability of alternative l is
ql =
exp(U(t1,l, t2,l))∑
144
k=1 exp(U(t1,k, t2,k))
l = 1, . . . , 144. (21)
6.2 Simulations
In this section we simulate some non-cooperative and cooperative equilibria. For these simu-
lations we stick to our reference person, specified in section 5.2 (a woman of age 55, who is
married and living in Germany, who has an 80 year old father in poor health, no mother, two
children, a medium education level, a remaining household income of 15,000 euros per year, and
a wage rate of 10 euros per hour). However, in this section our reference person is no longer
an only child. First, we assume that she has a sister, who has exactly the same characteristics
as herself. This sister lives 7.5 kilometers from the father. The first figure of 5 presents the
amount of care that these two sisters are providing to their father, for different geographical
distances of our reference individual.22 At the distance of 7.5 kilometers, both siblings have
21In section 6.3 we do a sensitivity analysis, which shows that the conclusions are not very sensitive to the
choice of the weights. The small differences can be explained by the fact that characteristics of siblings are often
about the same. The health status and country of living of the parents are naturally the same for both siblings.
Also, in 61.23% of the families the education level of the siblings is the same, and in 46% of the families the
gender of the siblings is the same.
22In section 5.2 we found that only those who have a relatively high unobserved random effect for informal care
provide informal care. In figure 5 we therefore assume the sisters to have unobserved preferences for informal
care at the 70th percentile, corresponding to the line ‘p70’ in section 5 (30% of the of the adult children have a
higher random effect us).
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Figure 5: Cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes for two siblings, by distance of the refer-
ence individual
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exactly the same characteristics, and we see that they indeed give the same amount of care.
When the distance of our reference individual to the parent increases, the amount of care
provided by our reference sibling decreases, but the amount of care provided by her sister
increases (she compensates for part of the loss of informal care). The total amount of informal
care provided is higher in the cooperative equilibria than in the non-cooperative equilibria.
Compared to the situation where our reference person was an only child (p70 in figure 1), in
the non-cooperative equilibria our reference person provides substantially less informal care.
In the second figure of 5 the sister of our reference person, explained above, has a high
education level instead of a medium education level (the two sisters still have the same wage
rate). In the presence of the higher educated sister, our reference person provides more informal
care in the non-cooperative equilibria than in the cooperative equilibria (until about 40 kilome-
ters), because she has a higher preference for informal care than her sister. When the reference
individual lives farther from their father, her higher educated sister increases her provision of
informal care slightly.
When we switch the education levels for our reference person and her sister (such that the
reference person has a high education level and her sister has a medium education level), we
find the equilibria shown in the third figure of 5. In the non-cooperative equilibria the medium
educated sister, who has the highest preference for informal care, provides most of the informal
care. In the cooperative equilibria informal care is more shared between the reference individual
and her sisters.
6.3 Interactions between siblings in SHARE
The simulations in the previous section show that the nature of the interactions between chil-
dren can have a large effect on the division of informal care between siblings and the total
amount of informal care provided to parents. In this section we apply the estimated structural
model parameters to families with two adult children in SHARE. First, we examine the fit of
cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria. Second, we investigate which siblings behave co-
operatively and non-cooperatively (using observed characteristics). Finally, we study the gains
that can be achieved by cooperation.
To examine the fit of cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria, we predict the cooperative
and non-cooperative outcomes for the siblings in SHARE (using their observed characteristics
and the structural parameter estimates from the only child empirical results), and compare
them with their realized outcomes. Cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria are described
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by probabilities for each of the twelve alternatives described in section 3, for both siblings. We
examine the fit of the cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria by the sum (over siblings)
of the probabilities for the realized options, divided by the number of siblings. This can be
interpreted as the percentage of correct predictions of the model. The non-cooperative model
has a higher fit than the cooperative model (26.8% versus 17.3%). In the non-cooperative model
siblings provide on average 1.13 hours of informal care per week, whereas in the cooperative
model this is 1.63 hours. The realized average hours of informal care is also closer to the
non-cooperative outcome than to the cooperative outcome, namely 1.18 hours per week.
The next question we want to answer is which people tend to behave cooperatively and
which people tend to behave non-cooperatively. We measure the degree of non-cooperativeness
by the difference between the non-cooperative and the cooperative predicted probabilities for
the realized outcome. Figure 6 shows the histogram of this measure of non-cooperativeness and
can be interpreted as follows: when the degree of non-cooperativeness is 0.1, the predicted prob-
ability for the observed outcome is 10%-points higher in the non-cooperative model, compared
to the cooperative model.
Figure 6: Histogram degree of non-cooperativeness
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The histogram shows that for most of the families (71%) the predicted probability for the
observed outcome is higher in the non-cooperative model than in the cooperative model (the
non-cooperative model has a better fit). For 47% of the families the predicted probability for
the observed outcome is even more than 10%-points higher in the non-cooperative model than
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in the cooperative model.23 The spike around zero includes families for whom the cooperative
and the non-cooperative outcomes are about the same.
We regress the degree of non-cooperativeness on several background characteristics of the
siblings. The results in table 10 show that, relative to two sisters, the non-cooperativeness of
two brothers is on average 10.5%-points higher (a 10.5%-points higher difference between the
predicted probabilities of the observed outcomes for the non-cooperative and the cooperative
model). Also, a brother-sister relationship appears to be more cooperative than a brother-
brother relationship. This may be explained by the fact that traditionally women are kin
keepers. It has been found that sister-to-sister relationships and sister-to-brother relationships
show on average greater emotional closeness and more frequency of contact than brother-brother
relationships (Connidis and Campbell, 1995). Furthermore, when both of the siblings have a
high education level, or when one of them has a high education level and the other a medium ed-
ucation level, they are significantly less cooperative than two medium or low educated siblings.
On average, relative to two medium educated siblings, the non-cooperativeness of two higher
educated siblings is 3.2%-points higher. Finally, older siblings and siblings with a large age
difference have a significantly higher probability of behaving cooperatively, and the differences
in cooperativeness between countries are small. Siblings in Austria and the Netherlands behave
slightly more cooperatively than siblings in Sweden, while siblings in Spain, Italy and Denmark
behave somewhat less cooperatively. In the results of table 10, the degree of non-cooperativeness
and the preferences for informal care are separated by the assumption that differences in be-
havior between children with and without siblings are due to dissimilar constraints only. For
example, table 10 shows that women are more cooperative than men, where we already take
into account that women also have higher preferences for informal care than men (table 9).
Also, for example, wage rates are taken into account in the structural model, such that higher
opportunity costs resulting from higher wage rates of men cannot explain the higher degree of
non-cooperativeness of men compared to women.
To obtain insights into the gains that can be achieved from cooperation, we compute the
increase in the hours of informal care that would occur if those who seem to be non-cooperative
23A sensitivity analysis shows that the conclusions are not very sensitive to the weights chosen in equation
(20). For example, when we choose the weights to be 0.3 and 0.7 (instead of 0.5 and 0.5) the fit of the cooperative
model is 14.6% instead of 17.3%, the number of hours of informal care is 1.81 instead of 1.63, 75% of the families
have a better fit for the non-cooperative equilibrium (instead of 71%), and for 50% of the families the predicted
probability for the observed outcome is more than 10%-points higher in the non-cooperative model than in the
cooperative model (instead of 47% when the weights are 0.5 and 0.5).
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were to change to cooperative behavior. If those who tend to be non-cooperative (who have a
higher probability to be non-cooperative than to be cooperative) were pushed into cooperative
behavior, their average provision of informal care would increase from 1.04 hours per week to
1.52 hours per week. So, their parents would on average receive 0.96 hours of informal care per
week more from their children, which is a growth of 46.2%. While informal care increases when
families are pushed into their cooperative outcome, the number of individuals working full-time
in the labor market decreases by 5.7%-points and the number of individuals working part-time
increases by 6.7%-points.
38
Table 10: Degree of non-cooperativeness
Coef. Std. err. p-value
Gender
2 sisters 0.000 - -
brother and sister 0.020 0.004 0.00
2 brothers 0.105 0.005 0.00
Age
Age youngest sibling -0.004 0.000 0.00
Age difference between the siblings -0.002 0.001 0.00
Education
Both low education level -0.014 0.010 0.17
Both medium education level 0.000 - -
Both high education level 0.032 0.004 0.00
Low and medium education level -0.018 0.008 0.02
Low and high education level -0.006 0.015 0.67
Medium and high education level 0.021 0.004 0.00
Number of children
Minimum number of children of both siblings -0.004 0.002 0.07
Difference in number of children between siblings 0.000 0.002 0.91
Partners
No partners 0.000 - -
One sibling has a partner -0.004 0.009 0.63
Both siblings have a partner -0.006 0.009 0.53
Country of the parents
Sweden 0.000 - -
Austria -0.016 0.007 0.04
Belgium 0.001 0.007 0.85
Germany -0.012 0.007 0.08
Denmark 0.019 0.007 0.01
Spain 0.031 0.008 0.00
France 0.004 0.007 0.54
Italy 0.030 0.008 0.00
The Netherlands -0.019 0.007 0.01
Czech Republic -0.011 0.007 0.12
Greece -0.005 0.006 0.45
Poland 0.013 0.010 0.16
Constant 0.238 0.017 0.00
N 2891
R2 0.25139
7 Conclusions
This study presents a structural model to analyze families’ complex decisions regarding informal
care provision for aging parents. In the model adult children maximize their utility, defined over
consumption, leisure, and the amount of care that parents receive from their children, subject
to a time and budget constraint.
In the first part of this paper the preference parameters of the model are estimated using only
children, such that interactions between siblings do not play a role. The results show that the
preference for informal care is influenced by the health of the parents, the gender and education
level of the adult children, and cultural and institutional differences between countries. Also
unobserved individual specific preferences such as altruism, reciprocity and responsibility norms
play a large role in the preferences of adult children to give informal care. The (negative) wage
elasticity of informal care supply appears to be small.
The second part of the paper focuses on the strategic interactions between siblings. In the
literature it has been emphasized that modeling family decisions as a bargaining process is
important to increase our understanding of these decisions. An important follow-up question is
whether this bargaining process is cooperative or non-cooperative. In a structural model with
two siblings one has to make assumptions about the nature of the interactions between siblings.
When some families are cooperative and other non-cooperative, this cannot be identified in
general together with the other coefficients in a game-theoretic model. In some way, one needs
information about the (non-)cooperativeness of siblings, which is often not available. Most
often, empirical game-theoretic models assume that siblings make non-cooperative informal care
decisions. This study aims to establish the nature of the interactions between siblings using the
structural parameter estimates of only children. We show that the nature of the interactions
between siblings can have a large effect on the division of informal care between siblings and
the total amount of informal care provided to parents. Furthermore, it appears that for 71%
of the siblings, the non-cooperative model has a better fit than the cooperative model (which
means that the assumption of non-cooperative siblings used by current game-theoretic models
is most likely for the majority of the siblings). The degree of cooperativeness varies most with
the gender of the siblings. The fit of the non-cooperative model compared to the cooperative
model is 10.5%-points higher for two brothers than for two sisters.
Furthermore, two higher educated siblings or a higher and medium educated sibling appear
to be less cooperative on average than two medium or lower educated siblings, and older siblings
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have a significantly higher probability to behave cooperatively.
For future research it may be interesting to estimate this model using U.S. data from the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The HRS has the advantage that it also contains infor-
mation about family income of the adult children.
For policy design we can conclude that a reduction in the geographical distance between
adult children and their parents would be an effective measure to increase informal care as well
as the labor force participation of those children with a relatively high preference for informal
care. For example, the social rent sector could weigh informal care in their assignment of houses,
or senior houses could be built in residential areas. For fiscal policies it may be of interest that
net wages have negligible effects on the provision of informal care, while they do influence labor
supply. Pushing non-cooperative families into their cooperative equilibria would increase the
provision of informal care, but this would be at the expense of the labor supply of adult children.
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A Logit equilibrium
Section 6.1.1 explains the non-cooperative logit equilibrium, which is a generalization of the
Nash equilibrium and deals with ‘noisy decisions’ made by bounded-rational siblings. This
equilibrium concept extends the model for only children described in section 3, to a game
theoretic framework with two players.
In section 6 we have two siblings, i and j who can choose between 12 alternatives. Therefore,
to obtain the logit equilibrium we have to solve a system of 24 nonlinear equations, the logit
response functions. The logit response functions of sibling i are
pi,1 =
exp(U(ti,1|j = 1)pj,1 + U(ti,1|j = 2)pj,2 + · · ·+ U(ti,1|j = 12)pj,12)∑
12
k=1 exp(
∑
12
m=1 U(ti,k|j = m)pj,m)
pi,2 =
exp(U(ti,2|j = 1)pj,1 + U(ti,2|j = 2)pj,2 + · · ·+ U(ti,2|j = 12)pj,12)∑
12
k=1 exp(
∑
12
m=1 U(ti,k|j = m)pj,m)
...
pi,12 =
exp(U(ti,12|j = 1)pj,1 + U(ti,12|j = 2)pj,2 + · · · + U(ti,12|j = 12)pj,12)∑
12
k=1 exp(
∑
12
m=1 U(ti,k|j = m)pj,m)
The logit response functions of sibling j are
pj,1 =
exp(U(tj,1|i = 1)pi,1 + U(tj,1|i = 2)pi,2 + · · ·+ U(tj,1|i = 12)pi,12)∑
12
k=1 exp(
∑
12
m=1 U(tj,k|i = m)pi,m)
pj,2 =
exp(U(tj,2|i = 1)pi,1 + U(tj,2|i = 2)pi,2 + · · ·+ U(tj,2|i = 12)pi,12)∑
12
k=1 exp(
∑
12
m=1 U(tj,k|i = m)pi,m)
...
pj,12 =
exp(U(tj,12|i = 1)pi,1 + U(tj,12|i = 2)pi,2 + · · ·+ U(tj,12|i = 12)pi,12)∑
12
k=1 exp(
∑
12
m=1 U(tj,k|i = m)pi,m)
These 24 equilibrium conditions have to be solved numerically since there is no closed-form
solution.
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